LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
CONSIDERATIONS IN THE DECISIONS
OF JUDGE BREYER
HOWARD LATIN*

I
INTRODUCTION

Science and law embody fundamentally different decisionmaking norms.'
When confronted by complexity and uncertainty, the scientist properly
reserves judgment pending the development of testable hypotheses and
sufficient data to validate theoretical predictions. From the perspective of
science, many important questions must be characterized as indeterminate.
Lawyers and social policymakers have no comparable opportunity to suspend
judgment, because "no decision" is a decision that promotes the interests of
disputants who benefit from the status quo. The primary focus of law, and the
central responsibility of judges, is the resolution of conflicts in a timely and
equitable manner. One implication of this responsibility is that judges and
other legal decisionmakers must often rely on crude but administrable rules
which preclude consideration of some scientifically or logically relevant
issues .2

In a 1983 essay, Judge Stephen G. Breyer of the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit made similar observations about the disciplinary
perspectives of lawyers and economists. 3 Judge Breyer acknowledged that
legal decisionmakers in fields such as antitrust and utility regulation must
have a clear understanding of pertinent economic concepts and facts. 4 He
stressed, however, that law and regulation are "in large part administrative
activities" which require rules that must be simple, fairly uniform, stable over
time, capable of application by nonexperts, and, above all, useful for
resolution of disputes litigated through the adversarial process. 5 Judge
Copyright © 1988 by Law and Contemporary Problems
* Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Newark, New Jersey.
1. See Latin, The "Significance" of Toxic Health Risks: An Essay on Legal Decisionmaking Under
Uncertainty, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 339, 339 (1982).
2.

See id. at 355-59, 380-86; see also S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 103-04 (1982);

Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning"
Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1275 n.30, 1329-30 (1985).
3. See Breyer, Economics for Lawyers andJudges, 33J. LEGAL EDUC. 294 (1983).
4. See id. at 295. Judge Breyer noted that some rules of law adopt economic concepts, such as
monopoly power, as part of a legal test, and other rules of law require proof consisting at least in part
of economic evidence.
5. Id. at 296 (emphasis in original).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 50: No. 4

Breyer noted that economists can simply find the evidence inconclusive, but
lawyers must recommend outcomes despite uncertainty. 6 Economists usually
cannot measure all relevant variables or conduct controlled prospective
studies in a continually changing world. 7 Economists tend to "hold constant a
broad range of variables" while they examine one in detail,8 but lawyers
typically must try to consider all material factors and must often "reject
complexity" in order to achieve "justice." 9 Given his emphasis on the
disciplinary limitations of economics and the need for administrable legal
rules, Judge Breyer unsurprisingly concluded that he had "seen few cases, if
any, in the decision of which economics played an important role."' 0
After an examination of the approximately one hundred judicial opinions
Judge Breyer authored in 1984 and 1985, I can say confidently that he has
continued to emphasize legal and administrative considerations rather than
economic analysis. His opinions, however, reveal a broader range of
decisional criteria than those concerned primarily with the administrability of
legal rules. This essay provides a relatively systematic discussion of the
interplay between legal and economic factors, and explains the basis for my
agreement with Judge Breyer's conclusion that legal considerations will
generally prove determinative in the decisions of federal appellate judges.
Part I presents a simplified taxonomy of criteria that are important in the
resolution of legal disputes. These decisional factors are organized into six
general clusters: Allocation of Institutional Responsibilities, Justiciability
Constraints, Unquantifiable and Incommensurable Interests, Fairness and
Evenhanded Justice, Global Efficiency Effects, and Microefficiency Effects.
These clusters reflect different considerations that often cut in opposite
directions, and only the latter two sets of criteria fit comfortably within the
purview of economic analysis. Moreover, judges seldom possess sufficient
information and expertise to make reliable predictions about the effects of
their decisions on the broad realms of private and institutional behavior
subsumed under the "global efficiency" category. Judges consequently tend
to make legal or intuitional rather than economic assessments of factors
within this category." Thus, courts decide cases through balancing the
quantifiable interests of parties in each dispute, which is the characteristic
approach of conventional "law and economics" analysis, only when they
conclude that "microefficiency" criteria should dominate the other five
clusters of decisional factors in a specific type of case. In this taxonomy and
discussion, Judge Breyer's recent opinions serve as an informal "database" to
illustrate competing legal and economic considerations; however, the same
6. See id. at 296-97, 304.
7. See id. at 303-04.
8. Id. at 304.
9. Id. at 297, 304.
10. Id. at 294.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 52-75, 129-38. For example, ajudge may believe that legal
predictability is important because it enables private actors to make better informed investment
decisions, but the judge would never be able to quantify the economic value of this intuition.
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types of decisional factors would likely appear in any comparable sample of
appellate cases.
Part II examines in greater depth two ofJudge Breyer's decisions on torts
issues with which I am familiar. The results reached in those cases are
arguably "inefficient," although not necessarily wrong from a legal
perspective, and greater attention to economic criteria could have been used
in these opinions. Nevertheless, the primary purpose of these case analyses is
not to criticize Judge Breyer's treatments, but instead to demonstrate how
legal and administrability concerns play a prominent role in the resolution of
disputes that may be reasonably amenable to economic analysis. Federal
appellate cases often present a variety of significant legal and economic
considerations, and the relative weights assigned to different factors are likely
to be imprecise and debatable. The central theme in this discussion is that the
judicial choice among competing decisional criteria requires a legal rather
than an economic judgment. Although one may disagree with Judge Breyer
about the desirable outcomes in specific cases and about the comparative
importance of efficiency and administrability in some legal contexts, I support
his general rejection of the aggrandizing "law and economics" claim that
economic considerations are, or should be, determinative in most judicial
decisions.
II
A

TAXONOMY OF COMMON DECISIONAL CRITERIA

This section presents a taxonomy that describes systematically a number
of distinctive concerns which underlie many judicial decisions, and which
often counterbalance economic considerations in particular categories of
cases. The catalog does not attempt to list every factor that may influence
judicial decisions, and alternative arrangements of the identified criteria might
prove equally satisfactory. Some factors, such as the value of predictability or
strict compliance with procedural requirements, could be listed in several of
the clusters. This observation simply indicates that legal principles may
concurrently serve several useful purposes.
A.

Allocation of Institutional Responsibilities

The authority of federal appellate courts is frequently circumscribed by
their need to preserve the decisionmaking prerogatives of other institutions.
This cluster of legal considerations has been more often outcomedeterminative than any other set of criteria in the decisions of Judge Breyer.
In many opinions he stressed and, more important, showed deference to
legislative enactments,' 2 agency expertise,' 3 Supreme Court interpretations
12. See, e.g., Diamond v. Bucci, 732 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1984); Doe v. Anrig, 728 F.2d 30 (1st Cir.
1984).
13. See, e.g., Distrigas of Mass. Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 737 F.2d 1208 (1st
Cir. 1984); Department of Pub. Utils. v. United States, 729 F.2d 886 (1st Cir. 1984); Distrigas of
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of federal law, 14 precedents created by the federal courts of appeals, 1 5 state
court determinations of common law doctrines, 16 and factual findings by trial
courts'

7

or administrative law judges.'

On a rough continuum between

judicial activism and judicial restraint, Judge Breyer's opinions reflect a
tendency toward deference and restraint rather than pathbreaking assertions
of appellate court power. 19 Yet, any judge would acknowledge the
importance of these institutional concerns irrespective of whether they
promote or impede economically efficient results in specific cases.
For example, several utility regulation cases presented Judge Breyer with
the question of whether the FERC has authority to reduce future rates when it
finds that the previous rate structure was unreasonable. 20 If ratemaking
regulation is economically justified at all, it is difficult to see any compelling
economic rationale that would allow utilities to perpetuate unreasonably high
revenues. 2 ' Nevertheless, Judge Breyer held that the agency's delegated
authority permits it only to reject proposed increases, not to roll back rates
below previously approved levels. He reached this result through
construction of the applicable statutory provision as interpreted by a Supreme
Court decision he found controlling.2 2 Judge Breyer clearly understood the
applicable economic issues-one of his opinions presents an exceptionally
lucid description of economic factors relevant to the regulatory process 2 3Mass. Corp. v. Boston Gas Co., 693 F.2d 1113 (1st Cir. 1982). But see New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Public Utils. Comm'n, 742 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984).
14. See, e.g., Barber Lines v. Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50 (1 st Cir. 1985); Distrigas of Mass. Corp. v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 751 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1984).
15. See, e.g., Barber Lines v. Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50 (1st Cir. 1985); Martinez v. Sea Land
Servs., Inc., 763 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1985).
16. See, e.g., Plante v. Hobart Corp., 771 F.2d 617 (1st Cir. 1985); Lee v. El Fenix de Puerto Rico,
739 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1984); Laureano-Agosto v. Garcia-Caraballo, 731 F.2d 1010 (1st Cir. 1984).
17. See, e.g., Jordan v. United States Lines, Inc., 738 F.2d 48 (1st Cir. 1984); Silva v. Showcase
Cinemas Concessions of Dedham, Inc., 736 F.2d 810 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 883 (1984).
18. See, e.g., Dugan v. Ramsay, 727 F.2d 192 (1st Cir. 1984); see alsoJasinskas v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 735 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984) (Worker's Comp. Board should have remanded issue to
administrative law judge for factual determination).
19. I found no case in which Judge Breyer refused to follow the weight of existing judicial
precedents, as he characterized them, and no case in which he set aside a factual determination made
at the trial level. See, e.g., Jordan v. United States Lines, Inc., 738 F.2d 48 (1st Cir. 1984).
20. See Distrigas of Mass. Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 737 F.2d 1208, vacated
and remanded, 751 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1984); Distrigas of Mass. Corp. v. Boston Gas Co., 693 F.2d 1113
(1st Cir. 1982).
21. The issue in these cases is not whether the FERC can require the gas supplier to reimburse
customers for past rates that were too high, which it generally cannot, but whether the agency can
impose a rate structure for future charges that reduces the regulated industry's revenue below the
level that had previously been authorized. If the agency finds that current rates are unreasonably
high, the effect of prohibiting the FERC from reducing future rates below prevailing levels would be
to retain an inefficient rate structure simply because it was approved at some time in the past. Given
the many complexities and uncertainties in ratemaking regulation, it is easy to see how an agency
could authorize a rate structure requested by a utility and then later might conclude on the basis of
new information that the rate level is excessive.
22. See Distrigas of Mass. Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 751 F.2d 20, 22 (1st Cir.
1984) (citing Federal Power Comm'n v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 391 U.S. 9, 21-25 (1968)); Distrigas of
Mass. Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 737 F.2d 1208, 1224 (Ist Cir. 1984).
23. See Distrigas of Mass. Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 737 F.2d 1208, 1211-14
(1st Cir. 1984).
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but his decisions were determined by statutory and Supreme Court
commands that preclude an independent economic analysis. It is doubtful
that any other appellate judge would have reached a contrary result on this
issue.
The key point here is that economic analysis may reveal which substantive
decisions are efficient, but economics provides little insight into which
institutions should be responsible for making various kinds of determinations.
In some instances, economic analysis could suggest the desirability of
centralized decisionmaking in response to economies of scale and public
goods problems, or the desirability of decentralized choices when local actors
are most likely to possess required information. These economic
considerations are, however, far less important than the federal governmental
structure and system of checks and balances in determining the appropriate
allocation of institutional responsibilities. The locus of decisionmaking
authority, in contrast to the content of the decisions, is essentially an
"arbitrary" choice from the perspective of economics but is frequently a
critical decisional factor for judges.
B. Justiciability Constraints
This cluster of decisional factors derives from basic conceptions about the
nature and limitations of judicial power, as reflected in doctrines such as
mootness 2 4 ripeness, avoidance of advisory opinions, and compliance with
class-action requirements 2 5 or other criteria for standing. 2 6 Although some
overlap exists between this cluster of factors and the preceding one, courts
may decide cases on nonjusticiability grounds even if there is no present
likelihood that other institutions will resolve the particular disputes or that
other parties will raise the same issues in court.
In contrast to the legal concern with justiciability, economic analysis
suggests that courts should often resolve contested issues when the factual
context is reasonably well developed in order to provide guidance for
similarly situated actors in comparable disputes. In Berkshire Cablevision of
Rhode Island, Inc. v. Burke 2 7 for example, Judge Breyer refused on mootness
grounds to adjudicate a challenge to the legal requirement for provision of
public-access channels because the plaintiff had not been awarded the
franchise. This treatment leaves potential applicants in doubt about the value
of cable franchises, and could therefore impede efficient competitive bidding
in the future. If communities determine the suitability of competing license
applications partly on the basis of the applicant's willingness to provide
public-access channels, then a cable system operator who questions the
24. See, e.g., Berkshire Cablevision, Inc. v. Burke, 773 F.2d 382 (ist Cir. 1985); NLRB v. Maine
Caterers, Inc., 732 F.2d 689 (ist Cir. 1984).
25. See, e.g., Mayburg v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 740 F.2d 100 (ist Cir. 1984).
26. See, e.g., Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d 922, 932-33 (ist Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1029 (1985).
27. 773 F.2d 382 (ist Cir. 1985).
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legality of this requirement may never obtain a franchise and be able to test its
validity in court. Because cable operators frequently compete for franchises
in many communities, it may be important for the particular plaintiff in the
"moot" case to determine the legality of the mandated practice. Thus, from
an economic perspective, the issue appears appropriate for judicial resolution
whenever a current or prospective franchise applicant is motivated to raise it.
A similar line of reasoning might be applied in many torts and contracts cases,
where judicial clarification of the applicable law may enable more efficient
loss-prevention and loss-spreading decisions by actors comparable to the
parties who initially raised the issues in court. Nevertheless, Judge Breyer's
refusal to address the disputed public-access requirement in Berkshire
Cablevision was certainly tenable, and likely mandated, by justiciability
concerns that militate against courts resolving legal issues unless they must do
SO.
C.

Unquantifiable and Incommensurable Interests

28
A number ofJudge Breyer's cases presented issues, such as free speech,
racial discrimination, 29 due process "property" rights,3 0 and criminal
procedure, 3' that are not readily amenable to economic analysis. In the essay
cited above, Judge Breyer observed that "noneconomic interests" often prove
influential in judicial decisions. 32 In theory, any source of human satisfactions
may qualify as an "economic" interest if people are willing to pay for it, 3 3 and
some "law and economics" commentators, Judge Posner and Professor
Becker for example, have engaged in procrustean efforts to fit noneconomic
issues into an economics framework.3 4 For the purposes of this paper,
however, the central question is whether economic analysis can help judges
decide particular cases that raise these types of issues, and I submit that
economics can seldom be very useful.
An important distinction must be made between economic terminology and
economic methodology. It is easy to say that interests in free speech or equal
opportunity must be balanced against competing interests "at the margin,"
but that claim hardly qualifies as economic analysis in any meaningful sense.
Some legal principles-for example, that accused criminals should be
presumed innocent until proven guilty, or that government should not
discriminate against people on the basis of race-derive from basic political
and moral values, and would be fundamentally distorted by attempts to fit
them into the utilitarian framework embedded in economic analysis. Other

28. See, e.g., Ozonoffv. Berzak, 744 F.2d 224 (1st Cir. 1984).
29. See, e.g., Sanders v. Fair, 728 F.2d 557 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1254 (1984).
30. See, e.g., Laureano-Agosto v. Garcia-Caraballo, 731 F.2d 101 (1st Cir. 1984).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Tedeschi, 774 F.2d 511 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Guarino,
729 F.2d 864 (1st Cir. 1984); Cruz-Sanchez v. Rivera Cordero, 728 F.2d 1531 (1st Cir. 1984).
32.

See Breyer, supra note 3, at 296.

33. See C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND
LAW 11-12 (2d ed. 1977).

MARKETS

3, 73-74 (1977); R.

POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF

34. See, e.g., Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968);
Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393 (1978).
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interests, such as the qualified right to an unblemished reputation, may be
characterized as "noneconomic" because they are extremely difficult both to
quantify and compare against competing considerations. It is, of course, true
that few noneconomic interests are so absolute or essential that they can
never be compromised in cases that raise important countervailing principles.
Yet, the resolution of such conflicts invariably requires legal judgments, not
economic determinations. Unless competing interests can be approximately
measured and then balanced in commensurable terms, economic
methodology could not provide reliable guidance on how legal disputes
should be decided. Many "law and economics" analyses of noneconomic
interests substitute economic labels such as "allocative efficiency" or "utility
maximization" for legal terms such as "reasonableness," but their conclusions
ultimately depend upon unvalidated intuitional assessments which closely
resemble the mode of legal analysis that courts have traditionally employed.
Replacing one set of terms with another does not make these "law and
economics" discussions any more "scientific" than conventional legal
treatments.
D.

Fairness and Evenhanded Justice

Considerations such as fairness, consistency, predictability, adequacy of
notice, compliance with specified procedures, and avoidance of bias or
conflict of interest also entail incommensurable noneconomic interests.
These criteria, however, are primarily concerned with how the law itself
should function rather than with promotion of substantive social goals. The
principles underlying these decisional factors are usually difficult to define
and confine in the abstract; yet, they are frequently influential in the
disposition of particular cases. In Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, for
example, Judge Breyer disallowed recovery of pure economic losses partly
because it might impose "disproportionate" liability in comparison with the
defendant's degree of culpability. 35 The New Jersey Supreme Court recently
reached the opposite conclusion on the same doctrinal issue because it
stressed the victim's "innocence" in comparison with the defendant's culpable
behavior. 36 This conflict of fairness perspectives also appears in the tension
between "foreseeability" requirements and the "thin-skulled plaintiff" rule in
proximate causation doctrine. 3 7 Economic assessments provide little
assistance in determining whether courts should focus on the injurer's or the
victim's degree of culpability as more important in the legal analysis of which
losses should be compensable. Nevertheless, most lawyers would agree that
these fairness considerations should be relevant to the resolution of many
cases.
35. 764 F.2d 50, 55 (ist Cir. 1985).
36. See People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 254-55, 495 A.2d
107, 111 (1985).
37. See generally Rabin, Tort Recovery for Vegligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37 STAN.
L. REV. 1513, 1531 n.59, 1534 n.71 (1985).
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In Itek Corporation v. First National Bank of Boston, Judge Breyer had to
decide whether an American bank should honor letters of credit issued for the
benefit of a government-controlled Iranian bank. 38 The letters were part of a
complex agreement negotiated between Itek and the Ministry of War under
the Shah's regime, and the post-revolutionary Iranian government attempted
to recover much of the payments made under the agreement. The contract
included a force majeure clause authorizing Itek to retain payments for work
completed if further compliance became impossible, 39 but it also stipulated
that disputes must be decided in Iranian courts applying that nation's laws.
Judge Breyer acknowledged that the "very object of a letter of credit is to
provide a near foolproof method of placing money in its beneficiary's hands
when he complies with the terms contained in the letter itself" and that
"examining the rights and wrongs of a contract dispute to determine whether
a letter of credit should be paid risks depriving its beneficiary of the very
advantage for which he bargained, namely that the dispute would be resolved
while he is in possession of the money." 40 Judge Breyer nonetheless
approved an injunction forbidding payments under the letters because he
thought the "recent history of relations between Iran and the United States
indicates" that any efforts by Itek to recover money through the Iranian courts
4
would be "futile." 1
Judge Breyer rationalized this decision partly on the grounds that the
beneficiary of the letters and the War Ministry "are both part of, or owned by,
'4 2
Iran's government, and they were equally aware of the relevant events."
The same institutional relationship, however, existed before the revolution
when Itek agreed to have disputes resolved under Iranian law, and it is
doubtful that Iranian courts were any more independent of government
policy under the Shah. Judge Breyer's decision ultimately rested on his view
that American litigants could not obtain a fair hearing in Iranian courts, and
most lawyers would similarly conclude that the need for impartial dispute
resolution should override any economic analysis of contractual terms.
Criteria such as predictability, consistency, and adequate notice may
frequently be efficiency enhancing because they enable private actors to make
informed investment decisions. Yet, these legal criteria possess noneconomic
dimensions that are probably more important than any associated efficiency
effects. Conceptions that "like cases should be decided alike" and that people
should not be held to legal standards they cannot possibly ascertain are
central aspects of our idea of "justice." The weight given to these principles
in the resolution of particular cases must be determined through legal and
ethical judgments, riot through economic analysis. Moreover, the factual and
social contexts of disputes are never precisely "alike," and courts typically
38.
39.
license
40.
41.
42.

730 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1984).
Compliance became "impossible" because the U.S. Government suspended Itek's export
for the military equipment. See id. at 26.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 25.
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employ the legal skills of analogy and distinction to decide whether different
cases should be treated within a common category and whether potentially
applicable precedents should be followed. Any claim that this cluster of
decisional factors is predominantly concerned with achievement of
economically efficient outcomes would misrepresent both judicial aims and
judicial methodology. As Professor Michelman has emphasized, cases may
often be resolved in a fashion that apparently promotes allocative efficiency
even when the promotion of efficiency is not an explicit or important ground
43
for those decisions.
E.

Global Efficiency Effects

Proponents of microefficiency analysis, Judge Posner and Professor Coase,
for example, contend that allocative decisions should be based on a balancing
of competing opportunity costs in light of the individual circumstances in
specific conflicts. This approach generally entails a "case-by-case" judicial
cost-benefit analysis tailored to the circumstances of particular parties. In
practice, however, courts are often more concerned with the effects of their
decisions on broad realms of institutional or private behavior. Decisional
criteria such as simplicity, uniformity, judicial economy, and administrability
concerns cut against judicial assessments of individualized circumstances, and
therefore frequently lead to judgments that conflict with the results suggested
by microefficiency analysis. Given Judge Breyer's sensitivity to administrative
considerations, his opinions predictably are filled with arguments against
case-by-case dispute resolution.
In Barber Lines, Judge Breyer contended that individualized determinations
of whether pure economic losses should be compensable would lead to an
undesirable expansion of tort litigation, with attendant burdens on courts and
litigants. 44 In Martinez v. Sea Land Services, Inc., he justified the "no fault"
attribute of the warranty of seaworthiness because it would often be "all but
impossible to allocate responsibility" for dangerous conditions "as between"
different parties. 45 In Distrigasof Massachusetts Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, Judge Breyer set aside the agency's decision to exclude from the
ratebase certain tax benefits obtained in the period before the natural gas
supplier became subject to regulation because he did not believe the FERC
could reliably discriminate between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" sources of
corporate assets acquired "prior to the time of regulation." 46 In New England
Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Maine, he refused to
allow private enforcement of FCC rules on the grounds that it might interfere
with creation of a nationally uniform communications policy, 4 7 increase
43.

See Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1015

(1978).
44. 764 F.2d 50, 54-55 (1lst
Cir. 1985).
45. 763 F.2d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 1985) (quoting Pryor v. American President Lines, 520 F.2d 974,
981 (4th Cir. 1975)).

46. 737 F.2d 1208, 1216 (1st Cir. 1984).
47.

742 F.2d 1, 4-5 (lst Cir. 1984).
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"procedural complexity," 48 induce issue splitting between the district and
circuit courts, 49 and place the authority to interpret a rule's scope and
meaning "squarely in the hands of private parties and some 700 federal
district judges, instead of in the hands of the Commission." ' 50 Judge Breyer
did not emphasize the individual circumstances of the litigants in any of these
cases. Indeed, in response to FCC intervention on behalf of the plaintiff's
position in New England Telephone & Telegraph, he observed:
Perhaps such private enforcement efforts would help the FCC deal with potentially
hostile state commissions in the immediate context of current telephone deregulation.
but, if one steps back to ask the broader question-whether, in general, a private right
to enforce FCC rules is likely to serve the Communications Act's regulatory ends-one
must be more doubtful.5 1

In many cases no clear boundary exists between microefficiency and global
efficiency decisional criteria because judicial analyses, even if explicitly
directed at the promotion of efficient market behavior, are grounded on
broad generalizations about the circumstances and capabilities of different
classes of actors. In Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc., for example,
Judge Breyer reversed a district court finding that the insurer's "ban on
52
balance billing" provision constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade.
That practice forbids participating doctors to charge insured patients higher
fees than the insurer is willing to pay for designated medical goods and
services. The district court found: -[T]he effect of this payment system, when
combined with Blue Shield's size and buying power, was to produce an
unreasonably rigid and unjustifiably low set of prices . . . [that] interferes

with the doctors' freedom to set higher prices for more expensive services and
discourages them from developing and offering patients more expensive (and
perhaps qualitatively better) services."- 53 But are prevailing prices actually
"rigid" and "too low?" Must doctors participate in the Blue Shield payment
system? Does the practice significantly reduce the quality and diversity of
medical services? If so, are those undesirable effects outweighed by the
benefits patients derive from the ban on balance billing? Judge Breyer and
the lower court agreed that these questions cannot easily be answered.
Indeed, the district judge described the case record as "two competing
54
mountains of mostly meaningless papers."
Judge Breyer noted the "great complexity" of medical cost issues, 5 5 and
marshalled an array of policies and precedents to support allowing the insurer
autonomy in its choice of payment systems. One important factor was "the
possibility that patients cannot readily evaluate (as competitive buyers)
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 7.
See id. at 6-7.
Id.at 6.
Id. at II (emphasis in original).
749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984).
Id. at 924.
Id. at 927.
Id. at 931.
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competing offers of medical service[s]." 56 Assuming the district court was
justified in finding that higher prices would prevail without the disputed
billing restriction, its conclusion does not resolve the critical question of
whether Blue Shield's practice should be regarded as a restraint on free
competition or as a corrective device to compensate for the typical patient's
inability to benefit from informed, effective competition. Should the practice be
characterized as a monopolistic interference with market choices or as a
desirable response to information scarcity and other market imperfections?
Judge Breyer resolved this conflict in global efficiency perspectives by
arguing that a "legitimate buyer is entitled to use its market power to keep
prices down," 57 the Sherman Act was intended to protect "consumers against
prices that were too high, not too low," 58 and "the availability of state
regulation [could] prevent abuse." 59 He also contended that a "claim that
Blue Shield's price scheme is 'too rigid' because it ignores qualitative
differences among physicians is properly addressed to Blue Shield or to a
regulator, not to a court." 60 These arguments are predominantly legal rather
than economic in nature, and they all reflect Judge Breyer's intuitional belief
that the lower prices result from a "legitimate" and beneficial, not
"predatory" or "unreasonable," exercise of market power. 6 1
In support of his analysis, Judge Breyer cited "a judicial recognition of the
practical difficulties of determining what is a 'reasonable' or 'competitive'
price." 6 2 He also stressed his reluctance to invalidate a longstanding and
63
widely accepted practice in the absence of clear proof that it is harmful.
Kartell is representative of many conflicts that depend on speculative global
efficiency judgments about whether markets would perform better or worse if
a challenged practice is proscribed. Courts seldom possess adequate
empirical data, explanatory models, and expertise to make this determination
through a reliable economic analysis. 64 Judges therefore tend to rely on legal
characterizations and on rough intuitional predictions about which decisions
will best promote underlying social policies. Even in cases where the
achievement of efficient market exchanges is the primary, if not exclusive,
judicial goal, considerations of administrability, predictability, or other global
56. Id. at 928.
57. Id. at 929.
58. Id. at 931 (emphasis in original).
59. Id. at 928.
60. Id. at 929.
61. Judge Breyer's contention that a buyer can generally use its market power to keep down
prices is surely an overstatement. He recognized, for example, that agreements by buyers to fix
prices would be unlawful. See id.at 930. If a single agribusiness had sufficient market power to
impose uncompetitively low prices on farmers, I doubt that Judge Breyer would find this practice
necessarily "legitimate" even if it results in somewhat lower prices for consumers. For a theoretical
critique of Judge Breyer's treatment of the monopsony issue, see Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After
Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 257-59 (1985).
62. Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d at 927 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1029 (1985).
63. See id. at 925, 928, 931.
64. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
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efficiency criteria that cannot readily be measured often prove more
influential than attempts to assess the individual economic circumstances of
the parties in each dispute.
In Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp.,65 perhaps Judge Breyer's most
influential antitrust opinion, the defendant had offered a substantial price
discount to the major buyer of pipe system components used in nuclear power
plants and had consequently achieved a dominant position in its particular
market. 66 The legal question was whether this price reduction was
"predatory" and "unnecessarily excluded competition" from the market. 67
Despite the particular defendant's undisputed market power, Judge Breyer
created a virtual per se rule against findings of "predatory" pricing when the
market price is above both marginal production costs and average production
costs. 6 8 He noted that:
[U]nlike economics, law is an administrative system the effects of which depend upon
the content of rules and precedents only as they are applied by judges and juries in
courts and by lawyers advising their clients. Rules that seek to embody every
economic complexity and qualification may well, through the vagaries of
administration,69 prove counter-productive, undercutting the very economic ends they
seek to serve.

Judge Breyer stressed that even legitimate price cuts may have a harmful
effect on competitors, and many rivals might challenge price reductions that
threaten their market share. 70 Yet, preventing "a firm from unilaterally
cutting its prices risks interference with one of the Sherman Act's most basic
objectives: the low price levels that one would find in well-functioning
competitive markets." 7' Judge Breyer observed that, from the perspective of
economic theory, "a price cut that leaves prices above incremental costs was
probably moving prices in the 'right' direction-towards the competitive
norm." 7 2 He also noted that when and how firms may engage in "predatory"
price cutting "is all much disputed-a dispute that is not surprising given the
difficulties of measuring costs, discerning intent, and predicting future market
conditions." 73 In light of the complexity and uncertainty of the economic
issues and the potential for high litigation costs, inconsistent results, and
deterrence of desirable price reductions, Judge Breyer concluded that "this
type of attack on prices that exceed both incremental and average costs would
more likely interfere with the procompetitive aims of the antitrust laws than
74
further them."
65. 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983), cited in Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 594 (1986) (Powell, J.).
66. See 724 F.2d at 229.
67. Id. at 230 (citing Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM, 559 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978)).
68. 724 F.2d at 235-36.
69. Id. at 234.
70. See id. at 235.
71. Id. at 231.
72. Id. at 232 (citations omitted).
73. Id. at 231 (citations omitted).
74. Id. at 236.
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Judge Breyer's primary arguments in ITT Grinnell did not pertain to the
economic circumstances of the parties, but rather to broad global efficiency
questions of administrability, consistency, and the possible effects of judicial
mistakes. The Supreme Court recently cited ITT Grinnell approvingly for the
general proposition that "mistaken inferences" in predatory pricing cases
"are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws
are designed to protect. [W]e must be concerned lest a rule or precedent that
authorizes a search for a particular type of undesirable pricing behavior end
up by discouraging legitimate price competition."' 7 5 This admonition makes
clear the need for courts to consider the global economic effects of their
antitrust decisions, not simply the individual circumstances of the litigants in
each case. It is difficult to determine empirically whether microefficiency or
global efficiency decisional criteria are, or should be, more important in the
resolution of legal conflicts, but I agree with Judge Breyer that
administrability and global efficiency effects must frequently be decisive
considerations.
Many "law and economics" commentaries concede that "information
costs," "litigation costs," or other forms of "transactions costs" may
occasionally preclude case-by-case determinations based on particularized
circumstances. 76 Yet, these labels are only economic terminology, and their
employment does not always enable meaningful economic analysis. In many
contexts, there is no recognized economic methodology for determining
whether the presence of "transactions costs" is sufficient to warrant legal
intervention and reliance on crude but administrable legal rules, or whether
voluntary market exchanges are preferable despite the presence of market
imperfections. The "law and economics" literature is replete with debatable
behavioral characterizations 77 and guesses about the effects of legal rules on
the parties' future actions. These analyses are frequently no more "scientific"
than traditional judicial intuitions about global efficiency effects, fairness, or
other legal considerations. Because judges must actually decide cases, not
merely describe countervailing factors that might be relevant to their
decisions, courts are often understandably reluctant to ground their
determinations on economic analyses that cannot be comprehensive or
reliable.
F.

Microefficiency Effects

None of Judge Breyer's decisions clearly treated the results of
conventional microeconomic analysis as outcome-determinative. The closest
approximation was probably Kenworth of Boston, Inc. v. PaccarFinancialCorp. ,78
where he held that a preliminary injunction was not warranted because the
75.
F.2d at
76.
77.
682-96
78.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986) (quoting 724
234).
See, e.g., Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & EcON. 1, 18 (1960).
See Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 677, 678-79,
& n.46 (1985).
735 F.2d 622 (lst Cir. 1984).
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plaintiff was unlikely to prevail on the merits of its antitrust claim and had not
shown irreparable harm arising from the disputed practice. The plaintiff,
Kenworth of Boston (KOB), sold Kenworth trucks manufactured by Paccar,
and the sales were initially financed by a Paccar subsidiary. Paccar also agreed
to buy back trucks purchased with its financing if a dealer became insolvent.
After Paccar refused to provide further financing to KOB, the plaintiff

complained that it could not acquire adequate financing from another source
unless Paccar extended its buy-back arrangement to sales not financed
through its subsidiary. When Paccar refused to repurchase its trucks in the
event of KOB bankruptcy, the plaintiff obtained a preliminary injunction from
the district court on the ostensible ground that Paccar's practice amounted to
79
an unlawful tying arrangement.
Judge Breyer's treatment of this case resembled a microefficiency analysis
because he examined the circumstances of the particular disputants and,
fairness,
did
not
emphasize
administrability,
uncharacteristically,
noneconomic interests, or global efficiency considerations. Nevertheless, the
outcome turned more on legal characterizations than on economic analysis.
He noted that in the normal "tying" context the victim must purchase one
good it does not want in order to obtain a desired product. In this case,
however, the defendant had unbundled its trucks, financing, and repurchase
agreement, and then refused to provide anything but the trucks to KOB.
Judge Breyer consequently found no unlawful tying arrangement on these
facts; indeed, it was KOB, not the defendant, that wanted to link the financing
and repurchasing agreement to Paccar's sale of its trucks.8 0 Judge Breyer also
observed that, even if the repurchase guarantee had the effect of tying the
trucks to the financing for those dealers who financed through Paccar's
subsidiary, he could not see how KOB would be harmed by this practice
8
because it was not required to use Paccar financing. '
From the perspective of economic analysis, the critical issue is whether
there was some attribute or effect of the defendant's behavior that would
impede efficient market transactions. Judge Breyer cited several economic
facts that might be material to this determination, namely that Paccar
produces only about eighteen percent of all heavy trucks sold,8 2 that Paccar

provides financing and the repurchase guarantee to only about forty-five
percent of the dealers selling Kenworth trucks, 8 3 and that KOB was eventually
able to obtain financing from another source despite the absence of the
repurchase agreement. 8 4 Yet, KOB was in the business of selling only
Kenworth trucks, and undoubtedly believed its competitive position was
harmed by Paccar's refusal to provide a guarantee offered to many other
dealers. The economic facts cited above do not clearly establish what the
79.
80.

See id. at 623.
Id. at 624.

81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 625.

84.

Id.
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correct "market definition" should be, nor whether the disputed practice was
anticompetitive or inefficient.
Many antitrust cases including the KOB-Paccar dispute are decided more
on the basis of the permissible limits of market autonomy than on economic
efficiency grounds. The dominant antitrust norm is that private actors should
be allowed to select any economic arrangements they desire unless those
transactions fall within a handful of proscribed practices, such as price-fixing
agreements or tying of distinctly separable goods. 8 5 Given the extraordinary
difficulty of determining what are the actual effects of a myriad of possible
economic practices and what alternative arrangements are available to each
party, courts seldom try to assess whether a specific transaction is really
efficient. Instead, judges usually review the economic evidence to see if it
documents one of the relatively few prohibited practices, and otherwise defer
to the autonomous choices of private actors. Because many markets are
distorted by unequal bargaining power, asymmetric access to information, or
other serious imperfections, there is no reason to believe that judicial
deference to individual autonomy will generally achieve efficient market
outcomes .86

Judge Breyer's decision in the KOB case was grounded on the plaintiff's
failure to show a "tying arrangement" or some other legally unacceptable
anticompetitive practice. If the plaintiff could have proven that Paccar's
behavior was clearly suboptimal-perhaps because it reflected an irrational
decision not to deal with KOB or because no other source of financing was
available-that "inefficiency" would not justify a contrary legal conclusion in
the case. Judicial determinations of antitrust violations depend upon legal
characterizations about whether the challenged practices are "unlawful," not
merely inefficient. While economic analysis of microefficiency effects may be
relevant to the necessary judicial consideration, it can rarely if ever be decisive
by itself. Judge Breyer reached the same conclusion in his essay on the
87
contrasting perspectives of law and economics.
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allocative efficiency. Once it is acknowledged that several different and
frequently conflicting decisional criteria are relevant to legal dispute
resolution, the courts must determine which weights should be assigned to
competing considerations. The central theme in part II is that this judicial
balancing of decisional criteria must itself be based on legal judgments, not
on economic analysis.
The following discussion develops this theme through relatively detailed
analyses of two torts issues raised in judge Breyer's decisions. Both issues are
reasonably amenable to economic analysis, which supports different
conclusions from those he reached. Nevertheless, both cases present
significant legal and administrability concerns that cut against economic
considerations and that arguably justify Judge Breyer's decisions. The
primary aim here is not to identify the "correct" resolution of these issues,
but instead to demonstrate that judicial balancing of competing decisional
criteria is fundamentally a legal function not determinable through economic
analysis.
A.

Res Ipsa Loquitur and Hotel Guests

In Lee v. El Fenix de Puerto Rico, the plaintiff was injured when a light bulb
exploded on the balcony of her hotel room.88 She sued the hotel on a res ipsa
loquitur rationale, and the district court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment. In a brief opinion, Judge Breyer affirmed the lower
court's action on the following grounds:
Puerto Rico courts do not apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur if the likely negligent
act occurred at a time when the object in question was outside the defendant's
exclusive control. And the doctrine does not operate if there is a "probable cause" of
the accident from which it could be inferred that the defendant was not negligent.
Here, the district court could readily reason that a light bulb that explodes is likely
defective and that the likely cause of the defect lies in its manufacture, not its use. If

so, the negligent act occurred when the bulb was manufactured, that is to say, when it
was outside the hotel's control. Thus, the court correctly
concluded that under the
89
law of Puerto Rico, res ipsa loquitur does not apply.

The central issues in this case are (1) whether the injured guest or the
hotel should be required to identify the bulb's manufacturer; (2) whether the
hotel or victim should bear the losses if the manufacturer cannot be identified
or joined in the suit; and (3) whether the hotel or guest should bear the losses
if the producer succeeds in showing that the explosion probably did not result
from a manufacturing defect. From the perspective of economic analysis, or
fairness for that matter, it is difficult to imagine how these issues could be
resolved in the hotel's favor.
Guests at hotels cannot be expected to compile a list of the equipment
furnished in their rooms and of the product manufacturers, nor would it be
efficient for each guest to do so if she could. The hotel, on the other hand,
purchases the equipment and could easily maintain records on its suppliers
88.
89.

739 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1984).
Id. at 25 (citations omitted).
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and where their products were installed. Moreover, an exploding light bulb is
likely to be destroyed in the explosion, which means the injured guest may not
be able to determine the manufacturer's identity after the accident without the
hotel's assistance. The hotel staff would generally be better able to collect
whatever post-accident evidence is available because the victim will frequently
be preoccupied by her injuries. Judge Breyer's treatment creates a positive
disincentive for hotels to keep precise records on their suppliers: if the hotel
identifies the manufacturer, it runs some risk that a jury may believe the
accident resulted from improper handling by its employees rather than from a
manufacturing defect. If the hotel does not disclose the manufacturer's
identity, however, the presumption ofJudge Breyer and the district judge that
the injury resulted from a manufacturing defect would insulate the hotel from
liability.
Another economic consideration is that the hotel may be encouraged to
purchase cheap but comparatively unsafe products if it ordinarily will not be
liable for injuries resulting from unexplained product failures. Clearly, the
hotel is much better able than guests to assess the reliability of products
offered by competing suppliers, and there is no reason why guests should
unknowingly be put at risk when the hotel chooses less expensive but less safe
equipment. The same logic would apply when the hotel selects a supplier that
is judgment-proof or cannot readily be sued in the jurisdiction where the
injury may occur. This set of arguments is not especially compelling because
hotels have strong nonlegal motivations to avoid injuring their customers.9 0
Nevertheless, applying res ipsa loquitur to hotels in this accident context
would create some marginal deterrent incentive, while Judge Breyer's
treatment creates a disincentive, however minimal, for hotels to exercise care
in the choice of their equipment and affords no compensating increase in the
propensity of guests to protect themselves. The traditionally high duty of
care imposed on innkeepers reflects a realistic policy judgment that customers
rely on hotels to provide safe premises and that hotels encourage this
reliance.
It also appears unlikely that Judge Breyer's treatment will significantly
reduce private litigation costs or promote judicial economy. He did not
explain how he concluded that light bulb explosions usually result from
manufacturing defects, but the manufacturer is very likely to argue that the
accident was caused by mishandling, improper installation, or product
damage after the bulb left its control. If this supposition is correct, the hotel
will typically be joined as a codefendant after the manufacturer is sued. The
only "judicial economy" would occur in cases where the plaintiff is unable to
identify the manufacturer and therefore is left without any remedy, but Judge
Breyer's analysis did not seem to contemplate or approve that circumstance.
90. I have argued that torts analysts should not simply assume that liability will always induce
significant accident-avoidance behavior. In some cases, actors do not understand or pay attention to
applicable liability rules, and in other circumstances nonlegal incentives are a much more powerful
determinant of behavior than are liability doctrines. See Latin, supra note 77, at 686-92.
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Moreover, in cases where the manufacturer is sued and is able to prove the
accident probably was not caused by a manufacturing defect, res ipsa loquitur
would almost certainly be applied against the hotel at that point. If "a light
bulb that explodes is likely defective," as Judge Breyer observed in the
passage quoted above, and if the manufacturer is found not responsible for
that defect, then the hotel is likely to be the responsible party. Thus, the
effect of allowing the plaintiff to sue the hotel initially on res ipsa loquitur
grounds would be to encourage the hotel to identify the product
manufacturer, without expanding the scope of litigation in most cases.
This analysis would not preclude application of res ipsa loquitur against a
product manufacturer when it can be identified, and many cases, most notably
Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. ,91 have relied on the doctrine in factual contexts
similar to the one presented in Lee. At least in recent years, these decisions
have not rested on assertions that a manufacturing defect is necessarily the
most likely cause or that the manufacturer had "exclusive" control of the
product. Rather, the application of res ipsa loquitur may be justified on a
variety of policy grounds, including deterrence, reliance, the likelihood that
material evidence will be destroyed in the accident, the frequent inability of
victims to establish the precise cause, the superior access of manufacturers to
relevant information and expertise, simplification of the judicial fact-finding
process, and the producer's ability to spread losses through enterprise
liability. 9 2 These considerations may be persuasive when the positions of
product users and manufacturers are contrasted, but they do not indicate that
res ipsa loquitur should be applied only to the manufacturer.
In cases such as Ybarra v. Spangard,9 3 courts have allowed plaintiffs to use
the doctrine against several independent defendants when uncertainty about
which one is responsible might otherwise prevent recovery for a clearly
compensable injury, and when the circumstances induce potential victims to
rely on those defendants for protection and for information about how the
accident occurred. The plaintiff's position in Lee meets all of these criteria. In
the absence of any claim of contributory negligence, the victim of an
exploding light bulb in a hotel room should be able to recover either from the
manufacturer or hotel. Uncertainty about the cause of the defect or about the
manufacturer's identity should not enable both possible defendants to escape
liability.
91. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
92. See, e.g., Halloran v. Virginia Chems., Inc., 41 N.Y.2d 386, 361 N.E.2d 991, 393 N.Y.S.2d 341
(1977);Jagmin v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 61 Wis. 2d 60, 211 N.W.2d 810 (1973). These policies are,
of course, the same ones cited by Justice Traynor in his famous concurring opinion in Escola, and
they are similarly applicable in the res ipsa loquitur context. In both strict products liability and res
ipsa loquitur cases, injured plaintiffs frequently cannot identify the precise defect or show that it
existed at the time the manufacturer placed the product in the stream of commerce because the
product has been destroyed by the explosion. Thus, the inability to couple strict products liability
doctrines with res ipsa loquitur would often defeat recovery in the very type of accident presented in
Escola.

93.

25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944), aft'd, 93 Cal. App. 2d 43, 208 P.2d 445 (1949).
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Even if all economic, fairness, and social policy considerations suggest that
this treatment would make "good law," the problem for federal judges is that
it may not represent the current law in Puerto Rico. To support his
conclusion that the jurisdiction does not allow res ipsa loquitur to be used
against one defendant when another actor is the "likely" cause, Judge Breyer
cited precedents from 1953, 1954, and 1963. 9 4 These decisions largely
predate the application of economic analysis to legal issues and also predate
the development of modern products liability law. Assuming, however, that
Judge Breyer and the district court judge correctly characterized the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur in Puerto Rican law, it is difficult to see how any form of
economic analysis could negate the obligation of federal courts to follow the
law of the jurisdiction in which the accident occurred. When important issues
pertaining to allocation of institutional responsibilities are raised in a case,
judges generally cannot balance those concerns against the economic effects
of their decisions. Thus, institutional considerations may often dominate the
other decisional criteria, while it is doubtful that the results of economic
analysis can ever outweigh significant limitations on the decisionmaking
authority of the federal courts.
B.

Compensation for Pure Economic Losses

The issue of whether a negligent actor must provide compensation for
economic losses without accompanying physical injury or property damage
arises in a variety of accident contexts, 95 but this discussion will largely be
confined to three 1985 cases that involved the commercial transportation of
oil and hazardous substances. In Barber Lines, Judge Breyer adopted the
traditional rule that denies recovery for economic losses except in a few
limited circumstances which he thought inapplicable. 96 In Louisiana ex rel.
Guste v. M/V Testbank, a majority of the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc applied
the traditional rule to all economic victims of a toxic spill except commercial
fisherman whose income was affected; 9 7 but five judges joined in dissenting
opinions that argued for a broader scope of recovery.9 8 In People Express
Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., the New Jersey Supreme Court
unanimously rejected the traditional prohibition in favor of a more permissive
"particular foreseeability" test. 9 9 These conflicting judicial treatments reveal
94. Lee v. El Fenix de Puerto Rico, 739 F.2d 24, 25 (1st Cir. 1984). I did not investigate Puerto
Rican law because the purpose of this paper is to analyze the economic arguments presented in the
text, rather than to determine whether each case was correctly decided on legal grounds. For
purposes of this discussion, I assumed that Judge Breyer correctly interpreted the law.
95. See generally Rabin, supra note 37.
96. Barber Lines v. Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 56 (1st Cir. 1985).
97. 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985) (Higginbotham, J.), cert. denied sub. nom. White v. M/V
Testbank, 477 U.S. 903 (1986); id. at 1034 (Williams, J., concurring); id. at 1034-35 (Garwood, J.,
concurring). The treatment of commercial fishermen was not before the appellate court, but the
district judge had allowed that class of victims to recover economic losses and several appellate
judges intimated that they approved this result. See id. at 1021, 1034, 1053.
98. Id. at 1035 (Wisdom, J., dissenting); id. at 1053 (Rubin, J., dissenting).

99.

100 N.J. 246, 262-68, 495 A.2d 107, 115-18 (1985).
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that the issue of pure economic losses raises a panoply of relevant decisional
criteria, with no single factor likely to be determinative. Thus, unlike in Lee,
courts must really balance competing considerations to decide the scope of
compensable economic damages.
The plaintiffs in Barber Lines incurred significant additional expenses when
an oil spill prevented their vessel from docking at its intended berth. The
district court dismissed their complaint on the grounds that economic losses
are not compensable without damage to the ship, and the court of appeals
affirmed that decision. Judge Breyer emphasized the many precedents
supporting this treatment, especially the leading Supreme Court decision in
Robins Dry Dock and the Second Circuit decision in Kinsman H.J00° He also
identified a number of administrability, fairness, and global efficiency
considerations that supported his reliance on those precedents. Judge Breyer
argued that allowing recovery for all foreseeable economic losses would
greatly increase the number of claims and the cumulative costs of litigation; 0 1
that it might impose disproportionate liability on defendants in comparison
with their fault; l0 2 that it might create perverse investment incentives because
actors may not be able to prevent or insure against potentially unlimited
liability; t0 3 that prospective victims might often be better able to insure
themselves against interferences with their commercial expectations; 0 4 that
allowing recovery of economic losses only when combined with physical
injury or property damage would confine the volume of litigation and yet
would frequently create sufficient deterrent incentives to avoid negligent
behavior;' 0 5 and that courts could seldom make principled distinctions among
categories of economic losses or classes of plaintiffs once they approve this
form of recovery in the abstract.106
Judge Breyer acknowledged that many cases have allowed recovery for
economic losses, and he attempted to identify special circumstances in which
exceptions have been authorized. These include the presence of intentionally
caused harm, defamation or injurious falsehood, negligent misrepresentations
about financial matters, loss of consortium, expenses on family members or
employers, and treatment of commercial fishermen as "favorites of
admiralty." 10 7 He then continued: "These exceptions seem designed to pick
out broad catagories of cases where the 'administrative'
and
'disproportionality' problems intuitively seem insignificant or where some
strong countervailing consideration militates in favor of liability."' 0 8 For
100.
Repair
1968)).
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Barber Lines v. Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 60, 51-53 (1st Cir. 1985) (citing Robins Dry Dock &
Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927)); Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.
See
See
See
See
See
See
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Id.

Barber Lines, 764 F.2d at 54.
id. at 55.
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id. at 55-56.
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id. at 56.
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example, Judge Breyer noted that compensation for economic losses caused
by misstatements of financial data is justified because "without such liability,
tort law would not exert significant financial pressure to avoid negligence; a
negligent accountant lacks physically harmed victims as potential
plaintiffs." ' 10 9 This exception has also been justified on the ground that the
public relies on the accuracy of financial disclosures. I 0 Yet, imposing liability
on accountants or lawyers for negligent misrepresentations raises the same
problems of high litigation costs, "disproportionate" liability, and judicial
difficulty in determining where liability should be cut off that Judge Breyer
found dispositive in Barber Lines. He must therefore have concluded that
deterrence and reliance interests may outweigh fairness, administrability, and
global efficiency considerations in the context of economic losses resulting
from negligent misrepresentations but not from oil spills.
Despite Judge Breyer's observation that "strong countervailing" policies
could militate in favor of liability,'
he devoted little analysis to whether the
particular circumstances associated with oil spills might merit exceptional
treatment. He instead borrowed from Kinsman II the analogy of a motorist
who negligently obstructs a tunnel, and then discussed the potentially
unbounded liability for economic losses that could result from oil spills or
tunnel accidents.' 1 2 This generalized analysis comports with a recurring
theme in his opinion that judges should not make economic loss
determinations on a case-by-case basis.' 13 He contended, for example, that:
[C]onsiderations "of administrability and disproportionality" offer plausible, though
highly abstract, "policy" support for the reluctance of the courts to impose tort
liability for purely financial harm. While they seem unlikely to apply with equal
strength to every sort of "financial harm" claim, their abstraction and generality, along
with the comparative inaccessibility of the empirical information needed to confirm or
invalidate them, mean that courts cannot weigh or apply them case by case. What, for
example, in cases like this one, are the added administrative costs involved in allowing
all persons suffering pure financial harm to sue the shipowner. . . . Is there a
problem of "disproportionality"? How far... [would] liability for negligently caused
oil spills, when added to the already large potential traditional liability, affect the type
of insurance carried, the incentive to mitigate losses, the incentive to transport oil
safely, the likelihood that shippers will use pipelines and domestic wells instead of
ships and foreign wells, and the consequences of these and other related changes? We
do not know the answers to these questions, nor can judges readily answer them in
particular cases.' 14

Yet, many similar imponderables would complicate judicial analyses in
misrepresentation, defamation, and physical injury cases where economic
losses are compensable. Administrability concerns and fear of unbounded or
disproportionate liability are undoubtedly important considerations, but they
do not explain all judicial treatments of economic losses and may be
outweighed in some accident contexts by competing criteria. Judge Breyer
109.
110.

Id.
See Rabin, supra note 37, at 1528.

111.

Barber Lines, 764 F.2d at 56.

112.
113.
114.

See id. at 52, 57.
See id. at 53-57.
Id. at 55.
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correctly argued that courts must "consider exceptions by class rather than
case by case," ' 1 5 but he did not discuss how classes may be distinguished and
how broadly or narrowly they should be defined. He also did not consider in
detail whether economic losses resulting from oil spills should be treated as a
distinct class of cases, at least with respect to some categories of potential
victims. Rather, his analysis of this accident context treated "unbounded
liability" and "no liability" as the only realistic alternatives.
The plaintiff in People Express Airlines suffered business-interruption losses
when a spill of ethylene oxide, a potentially explosive chemical, in a railroad
freight yard required evacuation of the surrounding area including the airlines
terminal.i 6 The plaintiff's property was not physically damaged because the
chemical spill fortuitously did not produce an explosion. In addressing the
economic losses issue, Justice Handler cited many of the same conflicting
precedents and policies enumerated by Judge Breyer. The New Jersey
Supreme Court, however, emphasized that "the overarching purpose of tort
law" is to ensure "that wronged persons should be compensated for their
injuries and that those responsible for the wrong should bear the cost of their
tortious conduct."' 17 Aside from this "fairness" perspective, Justice Handler
stressed the deterrence objective of imposing liability on parties who can
prevent accidents and "are best able to bear" the cost of dangerous
activities.'l8 He recognized the administrability problems presented by this
issue and the judicial difficulty in drawing consistent lines to distinguish
compensable economic losses from unrecoverable damages,19 but he
nonetheless held that "[t]he asserted inability to fix chrystalline formulae for
recovery on the differing facts of future cases simply does not justify the
wholesale rejection of recovery in all cases."' 20 In support of this conclusion,
Justice Handler reviewed many of the precedents allowing compensation and
argued that these "exceptions expose the hopeless artificiality of the per se rule
against recovery for purely economic losses." 21
Justice Handler identified several factors that he thought would prevent
imposition of unlimited liability, including the proximate causation tests for
remoteness and intervening causes,' 2 2 the plaintiff's "difficult task" in
proving expectation damages with a sufficient degree of certainty,' 2 3 and the
requirement for particular foreseeability with respect to the class of plaintiffs
and the type of economic losses. 12 4 The court described this particular
foreseeability test "in terms of the type of persons or entities comprising the
115. Id. at 56.
116. See People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 NJ. 246, 249, 495 A.2d
107, 108 (1985).

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.at 255, 495 A.2d at I11.
Id.
See id.at 252, 254, 263-64, 266, 495 A.2d at 110, 111, 115-17.
Id. at 254, 495A.2dat I11.
Id. at 261,495 A.2d at 114.
See id. at 252-253, 265, 495 A.2d at 110, 117.
Id. at 268, 495 A.2d at 118.
See id. at 262-64, 495 A.2d at 115-16.
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class, the certainty or predictability of their presence, the approximate
numbers of those in the class, as well as the type of economic expectations
disrupted."' 2 5 Justice Handler contended that this requirement was
consistent with a general principle abstracted from the precedents on
economic losses "that the extent of liability and degree of foreseeability stand
in direct proportion to one another."' 26 He acknowledged that some cases
will "defy" categorization based on particular foreseeability, and argued that
courts in those cases must "draw upon notions of fairness, common sense,
and morality to fix the line limiting liability as a matter of public policy."' 2 7
These somewhat ethereal criteria obviously leave more room for judicial
speculation and inconsistency than Judge Breyer would find appropriate, but
these criteria also are less likely to prevent "innocent" plaintiffs from
obtaining compensation for readily foreseeable losses. 128
Justice Handler held that the facts alleged by the plaintiff were sufficient to
establish a tenable claim of particular foreseeability. Pertinent factors
included "the close proximity of the North terminal and People Express
Airlines to the Conrail freight yard; the obvious nature of the plaintiff's
operations and particular foreseeability of economic losses resulting from an
accident and evacuation; the defendants' actual or constructive knowledge of
the volatile properties of ethylene oxide; and the existence of an emergency
response plan prepared by some of the defendants . . . which apparently
called for the nearby area to be evacuated to avoid the risk of harm in case of
an explosion."' 29 This emphasis on the specific circumstances of the parties
clearly indicates that a particular foreseeability test must be applied on a caseby-case basis, and the NewJersey Supreme Court explicitly concluded that the
doctrine should "be allowed to evolve" in the context of individual
adjudications.' 30 Thus, the opinions in Barber Lines and People Express Airlines
not only assigned different weights to competing decisional criteria, but they
advocated resolution of the economic losses issue through fundamentally
different adjudicative processes.
As a result of collision with another vessel, the defendant's ship in Testbank
spilled twelve tons of a highly toxic chemical that temporarily contaminated
about 400 square miles of waterways and coastal areas in the Mississippi River
Gulf.' 3 ' The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgments
against all economic loss claimants who did not allege physical injury or
property damage, except for commercial fishermen in the region. The
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions raised many of the legal
arguments and conflicting policy considerations described above, but it would
125.
126.
127.

128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 264, 495 A.2d at 116.
Id. at 263, 495 A.2d at 115-16.
Id. at 264, 495 A.2d at 116.
Id. at 254, 495 A.2d at 111; see supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
Id. at 267-68, 495 A.2d at 118.
Id. at 268, 495 A.2d at 118.
Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1020 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied sub.

noma.
White v. M/V Testbank, 477 U.S. 903 (1986).
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serve little purpose to repeat them here. There were, however, a few salient
points worth discussion. Aside from administrability concerns, Judge
Higginbotham's majority opinion stressed the need for a "determinable rule
of law" that would enable courts to reach predictable and consistent
decisions.' 32 He conceded that a "bright line rule" of damages "has the
virtue of predictability with the vice of creating results in cases at its edge that
are said to be 'unjust' or 'unfair,' "133 but he countered that "when lines are
drawn sufficiently sharp in their definitional edges to be reasonable and
predictable, such differing results are the inevitable result-indeed, decisions
are the desired product."'13 4 In contrast, Judge Wisdom's dissenting opinion
advocated reliance on individualized considerations of foreseeability,
proximate cause, and particularity of the damages suffered by each category
35
of plaintiffs.'
Appeals to the legal values of predictability and consistency always have
some allure, but Judge Higginbotham did not explain why they are persuasive
in this accident context. If a victim suffers physical harm as well as economic
losses, the court's treatment would authorize recovery of both types of
damages. Yet, the plaintiff in such a case would still have to establish the
presence of negligence and legal causation. The negligence test of
"reasonable care under all the circumstances" does not create a bright line
liability rule. The "remoteness" and "foreseeability" elements in the
proximate causation test must also be evaluated based on particularized
circumstances. Judge Garwood wrote in a concurring opinion that he
especially agreed with Judge Higginbotham's emphasis on the need "for
distinguishing, on a normative, pre-event basis, between the classes of cases in
which recovery will be allowed and those in which it will not."' 136 Neither
judge, however, indicated why predictability is more important for a damages
37
test than for liability and proximate causation requirements.
132. Id. at 1028.
133. Id. at 1029.
134. Id.
135. See id. at 1039, 1042-43, 1046-59. The proposed requirement of "particular damages" is
essentially the same as the test for recovery in a public nuisance suit.
136. Id. at 1035.
137. In the event of a widespread spill of oil or toxic substances, some physical harm is very likely
and its extent would depend on numerous factors outside the control or knowledge of the defendant.
The bright line rule will not provide useful guidance for potential defendants unless they can predict,
which in practice they frequently cannot, whether foreseeable economic losses will be associated with
physical harm that renders both types of damages compensable under the court's treatment.
Although Judge Higginbotham, like Judge Breyer, noted that victims may sometimes be able to
insure themselves against economic loss, see id. at 1029, the bright line rule also will not necessarily
lead to efficient levels of insurance because potential plaintiffs often cannot anticipate whether their
economic losses will accompany sufficient physical damage to enable recovery for both. Thus, the
actual impact of the bright line rule on the parties would not be very predictable. I therefore regard
administrability concerns as far more persuasive in this accident context than are global efficiency
arguments grounded on the supposed value of predictability. It also seems relevant that
inconsistencies resulting from individualized considerations of factual circumstances under the
negligence and proximate causation test have seldom justified adoption of bright line liability and
causation rules.
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marginal deterrence

effects, Judge Higginbotham

[W]e agree with plaintiffs that economic analysis, even at the rudimentary level of
jurists, is helpful. . . . Thus it is suggested that placing all the consequences of its
error on the maritime industry will enhance its incentive for safety. While correct, as
far as such analysis goes, such in terrorem benefits have an optimal level. Presumably,
when the cost of an unsafe condition exceeds its utility there is an incentive to change.
As the costs of an accident become increasing multiples of its utility, however, there is
a point at which greater accident costs lose meaning, and the incentives curve flattens.
When the accident costs3 8are added in large but unknowable amounts the value of the
exercise is diminished. '

When an actor's behavior is extemely inefficient, in the sense that resulting
accident costs far outweigh its benefits, this imbalance has rarely been
regarded by courts as an argument against the imposition of liability. The
critical deterrence question is whether the extent of liability is sufficiently
great that further liability would not create a significant marginal incentive for
accident prevention. Judge Breyer contended that recovery of economic
losses associated with physical damage would create "enough" deterrence in
the context of oil spills, but he recognized that the opposite conclusion may
apply for negligent misrepresentations of financial matters. Judge
Higginbotham similarly hypothesized that: "[w]ith a disaster inflicting large
and reverberating injuries through the economy, as here, we believe the more
important economic inquiry is that of relative cost of administration, and in
maritime matters administration quickly involves insurance." 3 9 He predicted
that the plaintiff's proposed rule change would "work a shift to the more
costly liability system of third party insurance." 140 Judge Higginbotham's
characterization of relative insurance costs is debatable because toxic shippers
must in any event obtain insurance to cover infliction of physical harm with
associated economic losses, and there are likely to be fewer shippers, with
lower insurance transactions costs, than potential victims. In other words,
both shippers and prospective victims must insure themselves under the
court's supposed bright line rule. Judge Higginbotham's claim that
administrative cost considerations outweigh marginal deterrence concerns is
even more speculative in this accident context. One might argue in the
alternative that the great potential for harm associated with transportation of
oil and toxic substances justifies legal imposition of comparably great
incentives for accident prevention.
The adoption of economic terminology and concepts does not necessarily
enable judges to perform meaningful economic analyses. Courts generally
lack the empirical information and expertise needed to balance competing
global efficiency considerations such as marginal deterrence effects and
administrative costs in a reliable manner. They must therefore either rely on
crude intuitions or eliminate analysis of these criteria altogether. To the
138.

Id.

139.

Id.

140.

Id.
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extent marginal deterrence is regarded as an important consideration, as it
should be in oil and toxic spill cases, 14 1 economic analysis suggests that a
single bright line rule against recovery of economic losses is likely to be
undesirable. Rather, decisions about compensability should be tailored to the
characteristic circumstances of different categories of accident contexts. A
judicial assessment of when the deterrent incentives curve has flattened, to
use Judge Higginbotham's phrase, clearly cannot be made once for all modes
of risky behavior.
In Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 14 2 another oil spill case, Judge Sneed of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals unsuccessfully tried to apply Dean Calabresi's
economic analysis framework. Judge Sneed noted that "we have no way of
evaluating the relative administrative costs involved," but he nonetheless
concluded that the determinative consideration was the defendant's ability to
"correct any error in allocation, if such there be, by acquiring the activity to
which the party has been made liable."'143 Judge Posner criticized the Oppen
decision as an "abuse" of economic analysis because "it is improbable that the
correct solution to the problem of oil spills is to merge the commercial fishing
industry and the oil industry into one giant finn."' 4 4 Judge Posner cited
Oppen as an instance where a court reached the economically correct result
even when the judge did not explicitly adopt or understand economic
analysis.1 45 Yet, Judge Posner's explanation of why the defendants should be
liable for economic losses may be little better than Judge Sneed's analysis.
Judge Posner argued that :
[The court's] conclusion that the oil companies should be liable for the loss to the
commercial fisherman even though the fishermen had no property right in fish they
had not yet caught seems correct as a matter of economics: only the oil companies can
take efficient measures to prevent or limit oil damage to the fish, and making them
liable to the fishermen will give the oil companies the correct incentives to take those
measures. But Judge Sneed's effort to articulate his reasoning in economic terms was
disastrous. 146

Any time a defendant is found negligent, that represents a judicial
determination that he should have taken measures to prevent the accident.
Judge Posner's argument is entirely unhelpful in deciding which negligently
inflicted economic losses should be compensable and which should not be,
the central issue in Barber Lines, Oppen, and a host of similar cases. The best
that could be said for his analysis is that it suggests defendants should always
be liable for all losses resulting from their negligent conduct, but that thesis
completely ignores "unbounded liability," "disproportionality," and "judicial
economy" considerations. Moreover, factors such as insurance costs,
litigation costs, and other administrative considerations are clearly relevant to
the economically correct treatment of oil pollution losses, but Judge Posner
141.

See infra text accompanying notes 147-50.

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 569-70.
Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. Cm. L. REV. 281, 300 (1979).
See id. at 300-01.
Id. at 300.
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ignored these global efficiency concerns and provided no hint of how they
could be estimated or balanced against deterrence considerations in
particular disputes. And, even from the perspective of microefficiency effects,
it is not obviously true that only oil companies can prevent these economic
losses. Professor Coase's famous analysis of social costs suggests that it might
be more efficient for the fishermen to move away in order to reduce their risk
of lost income from oil pollution. 4 7 Judge Sneed fastened on one economic
concept of doubtful utility in Oppen while identifying others that he thought
inapplicable or beyond his ability to calculate. Judge Posner fastened on one
relevant, but not necessarily decisive, economic concept while ignoring many
other economic and noneconomic considerations. His simplistic analysis
clearly does not support his conclusion that the case was rightly decided from
an economic viewpoint, and it is even less able to support his claim that
economic analysis should be a primary basis for judicial determinations.
Several important considerations cut against a bright line rule prohibiting
recovery of pure economic losses in oil and toxic spill cases. First, much of
the resulting physical damage will not be internalized through successful tort
suits. Spills of harmful substances frequently degrade environmental
resources-wetlands ecosystems, endangered species, or scenic vistas, for
example-that contribute to social welfare but are not "owned" in a
sufficiently concrete manner to support a claim for compensation. Spills also
have long term harmful effects that cannot be established in court with a
sufficient degree of certainty to meet legal causation requirements. For
example, even when fishermen in a case like Oppen or Testbank are allowed to
recover their immediate financial losses, there is little chance that they would
receive compensation if the fish population declines over time in response to
ecological stresses produced by a spill. In the same vein, we know that
exposures to toxic substances often create a potential for harmful health
effects, but long latency periods and other causal problems preclude some
affected individuals from obtaining compensation. Moreover, spills
frequently entail widespread effects that create relatively minor property
damage or health problems for large numbers of people; but the costs and
inconvenience of litigation may prevent many injured parties from suing for
compensation. In these cases, the physical harm for each affected person may
be small, but the cumulative social impacts can be substantial. Thus, from the
perspective of deterrent incentives, recovery of pure economic losses by some
categories of plaintiffs may serve as a partial surrogate for theoretically
compensable physical harms that are unlikely to be internalized through tort
suits.
Second, unlike in the case of the tunnel-obstruction analogy used in Barber
Lines and Kinsman H, parties responsible for oil and toxic spills generally
choose a scale of operations that creates an obvious risk of widespread
physical and economic harm if accidents occur. A few decades ago, oil was
147.

See Coase, supra note 76.
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shipped in small tankers and processed in relatively small refineries; but to
achieve economies of scale, the industry now employs supertankers and large
processing plants. Only a few toxic substances were in wide use before 1950,
but there are now hundreds, more likely thousands, that have been
introduced on cost-effectiveness and convenience grounds, and the quantities
of these substances have increased exponentially. This observation does not
suggest that these industrial decisions were either inefficient or morally
wrong, but they have greatly increased the chances of spills with serious
physical and economic effects for many segments of society. If private
decisions to increase the scale of operations and corresponding economic (as
well as physical) risks are justified on cost-effectiveness grounds, then it does
not seem unreasonable to require these activities to bear a greater portion of
the resulting economic losses than they do under the traditional rule. As
Justice Handler argued, 1 48 a defendant's actual or constructive knowledge of
the magnitude of risks created for particular classes of victims appears
relevant to the question of what level of liability is "disproportionate."
Third, current liability and damages doctrines apparently do not create
sufficient deterrent incentives in many spill contexts. There have been
numerous instances in which tankers are poorly operated or maintained, in
which crews are inadequately trained, in which toxic shipments have been
routed through urban or ecologically sensitive areas in order to save a few
hours of transit time, in which toxic shippers and producers have failed to
develop adequate contingency plans to deal with spills, and in which available
safety measures were not implemented until after potential disasters
occurred, if at all. These problems have led to increased federal and state
regulation, but those programs were not intended to preempt tort liability
and thus far have not clearly proven effective. It seems anomalous that courts
have recently increased the scope of theoretical liability for these activities
through application of a variety of strict liability doctrines,1 4 9 but most judges
continue to cling tenaciously to restrictive damages doctrines that dilute the
practical significance of these doctrinal changes.
Finally, allowing some categories of plaintiffs to recover pure economic
losses will not inevitably lead to unbounded liability. Shippers usually plan
their routes with care, and there is no reason why they cannot at least
generally identify some types of parties-for example, other shippers, resort
owners, owners of factories immediately adjacent to a railroad right of way,
and commercial fishermen-who are likely to be harmed by a spill. Such
judgments may have an undesirable ad hoc quality and cannot be perfectly
consistent, as Judge Breyer observed about Judge Wisdom's dissenting
analysis in Testbank.150 But the traditional rule is not applied in a perfectly
148. See People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 256, 262-63, 495 A.2d
107, 112, 115-16 (1985).
149. See, e.g., State Dep't of Env'l Protection v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 468 A.2d 150 (1983);
Siegler v. Kuhlman, 81 Wash. 2d 448, 502 P.2d 1181 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983 (1973).
150. See Barber Lines v. Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 1985).
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consistent manner either, and the distinction grounded on the presence or
absence of minimal physical harm is no less arbitrary in application than a
"particular foreseeability" test of the sort advocated by Justice Handler. This
analysis, however, has been tailored to the general circumstances of oil and
toxic spills. A particular foreseeability test would not be appropriate or
feasible in every accident context, and judicial determinations about which
losses are compensable should be made on a categorical, not case-by-case,
basis.
In summation, I disagree with Judge Breyer's treatment of economic
losses for three primary reasons: based on the predictable severity of harm
associated with oil and toxic spills but not tunnel obstructions, the creation of
effective accident-prevention incentives is especially important in this context;
his contention that liability for economic losses accompanying physical
damage may create "sufficient" deterrence is implausible in this accident
setting; and, while administrability and "unbounded liability" are important
concerns in spill cases, they do not outweigh deterrence considerations to the
extent that recovery should be barred for all classes of foreseeably injured
plaintiffs. These conclusions fall at least loosely within the bounds of
economic analysis, although they are grounded on intuitions about globalefficiency effects rather than on any formal economic methodology.
Nevertheless, Judge Breyer identified numerous difficulties with judicial
implementation of a relatively particularized treatment of economic losses,
and the weights he assigned to competing considerations cannot be
characterized as clearly "wrong."
The central theme in this discussion of pure economic damages is that
many decisional criteria will influence judicial determinations. Judges must
evaluate conflicting predictions about deterrence incentives, about
administrative costs, about the breadth of litigation likely to result from
alternative doctrinal treatments, and about the long term impacts of judicial
decisions on the investment strategies and behavior of different classes of
actors. In addition to these microefficiency and global efficiency effects,
judges must consider conflicting "fairness" and "proportionality" arguments,
conflicting case precedents, and conflicting assessments of the need for
consistency and predictability in varied accident contexts. It seems most
improbable that any unidimensional criterion, such as the promotion of
economic efficiency, could be determinative in all cases even if judges could
reliably ascertain the precise value of each relevant factor. And, in reality,
courts are unable to measure many important economic factors and virtually
all noneconomic ones. Although economic analysis can suggest some
interesting lines of inquiry, it could not possibly dictate how courts should
balance all relevant considerations. Thus, I agree with Judge Breyer's
emphasis on the limitations of economic analysis despite my disagreement
with his treatment of spill-related economic damages in Barber Lines.
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VI
CONCLUSION

The taxonomy in this paper identified six clusters of decisional criteria that
are commonly instrumental in the resolution of legal disputes. 51 Judicial
reliance on economic analysis of microefficiency effects would be appropriate
only when courts conclude that this type of consideration should take
precedence over all other clusters of potentially relevant decisional criteria.
In cases that present important issues pertaining to the allocation of
institutional responsibilities, justiciability concerns, or evenhanded justice,
those factors are usually outcome-determinative irrespective of any
conclusions suggested by economic criteria. In many other cases,
considerations of fairness, noneconomic interests, administrability problems,
and judicial intuitions about global efficiency effects are more influential than
insights derived through attempts at economic analysis.
The discussions of Lee and Barber Lines demonstrate that judicial
determination of which weights should be assigned to competing decisional
criteria from different clusters requires a legal rather than economic
judgment. Microefficiency effects may be worthy of judicial contemplation
and may occasionally prove decisive in cases where important variables can be
quantified, but systematic economic analysis can seldom provide the ultimate
basis for judgments by appellate courts.

151.

A possible seventh category could be added that would reflect legal concern with

redistributive effects, but none ofJudge Breyer's decisions appeared to be significantly influenced by
this type of consideration. In Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d 922, 928 (1st Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1029 (1985), he did observe that controlling the "rising costs of medical care"
would be desirable, but that is not necessarily a redistributive argument. He also noted that the
Sherman Act was intended to protect consumers against unnecessarily high prices, but any
redistributive concern there is derived from Congress, not judicial policies. Id. at 931.

